Interesting thoughts from Le Blanc. This would seem to put him in the supra-lapsarian camp, no? "They enlarge the word “predestination” too much who bring in to it the decree itself of creating man, and of permitting his fall." And interestingly, the line immediately prior seems this would not be agreeable to Westminster, which states that God decrees "whatsoever comes to pass": "creation seems less suitably to be placed among the effects of predestination." I find these two statements difficult to discern. He seems to be saying predestination does not include creation but yet the object of predestination is man qua created (or qua creatable?).
It's the very opposite. He does not like supralapsarians, (i.e., the object of predestination is man creatable), who put into predestination the creation and fall of man, rather than presuming it--like the infras do.
And while God decrees whatsoever comes to pass (i.e., via providence or predestination), he does not "predestine" whatsoever comes to pass).
As regards your final comment, the reason Le Blanc thinks that creation can't be an effect of predestination is precisely because mankind, then, can't be the object of predestination! If predestination doesn't presume creation, but rather brings it about, it can't presume man as its object, but must also bring him about--a silly supposition according to Le Blanc.
Interesting thoughts from Le Blanc. This would seem to put him in the supra-lapsarian camp, no? "They enlarge the word “predestination” too much who bring in to it the decree itself of creating man, and of permitting his fall." And interestingly, the line immediately prior seems this would not be agreeable to Westminster, which states that God decrees "whatsoever comes to pass": "creation seems less suitably to be placed among the effects of predestination." I find these two statements difficult to discern. He seems to be saying predestination does not include creation but yet the object of predestination is man qua created (or qua creatable?).
-Eric Parker+
It's the very opposite. He does not like supralapsarians, (i.e., the object of predestination is man creatable), who put into predestination the creation and fall of man, rather than presuming it--like the infras do.
And while God decrees whatsoever comes to pass (i.e., via providence or predestination), he does not "predestine" whatsoever comes to pass).
As regards your final comment, the reason Le Blanc thinks that creation can't be an effect of predestination is precisely because mankind, then, can't be the object of predestination! If predestination doesn't presume creation, but rather brings it about, it can't presume man as its object, but must also bring him about--a silly supposition according to Le Blanc.
By put into I mean: make it an effect.
Ah, thanks. This topic always makes my head spin. Thanks for the translation!