Martin Becanus Q. 2: Whether the divine attributes are rationally [that is, by reason] distinguished amongst themselves and the divine essence?
Summa Theologiae Scolasticae (Lyon, 1620).
1. The divine attributes are able to be looked at in two ways: 1. As they are from the part of the thing; 2. As they are conceived by us in this life. I have shown thus far that, according to the first way, they are not actually distinguishable from the nature of the thing, either among themselves or from the divine essence, but only virtually or eminently. Now it is asked about these attributes, insofar as they are conceived by us in this life, whether they are at least rationally distinguished amongst themselves and the divine essence. Some of the nominalists deny this. Their reason is because that which is in itself indivisible and lacking distinction from its own nature, is not able to be divided or distinguished by something extrinsic. But the divine essence and attributes are something in themselves indivisible and lacking distinction from their own nature, as it was said, and our intellect is something extrinsic to them. Therefore, [so they conclude] through our intellect they are not able to be distinguished or divided amongst themselves. Nevertheless, we think they are [able to be rationally distinguished].
2. First Conclusion. Among the divine attributes and essence, as they are conceived by us in this life, there is a rational distinction which arises from a twofold source: 1. From their virtual distinction; 2. From the imperfection of our intellect. For, [it arises] partly from the fact that God is so perfect that through his own simplicity and indistinct beingness he is able to surpass all those things which we ourselves excel by the many distinctions distinct among themselves; [and it arises] partly from the fact that our intellect in this life is not able to adequately conceive in one concept that whole perfection of God; but that act of conceiving requires many inadequate concepts, and it conceives that perfection of God through the appearances of created things, which individually do not adequately represent the whole perfection of God. From both of these points, I say, the most important point arises, that by forming many conceptions about the same most-simple thing, we mean: to distinguish it through its own conceptions, which is to distinguish by reason. For a distinction of reason, about which we now treat, exists in that the intellect conceives and apprehends one and the same thing by distinct inadequate concepts.
3. You might object that therefore our intellect falsely and with error conceives God because it forms diverse formal concepts about one and the same simple thing, which [concepts] are not able to come about without falsity. For the formal concept which we form concerning something apprehended through the intellect is not able to be true unless the objective concept corresponds in the thing itself to it. But in God, just as in a most-simple thing, it is not [able to be true] unless he is the one objective concept and the same most-simple being (seeing that the objective concept is nothing other than the thing itself which is conceived, insofar as it is the object of the formal concept). Therefore, concerning God, we are not able to truly form distinct formal concepts, and if we do make them, we make them falsely and with error. The solution of this dilemma depends upon the following conclusion.
4. Second Conclusion. That distinction of reason which is between the essence and divine attributes as they are conceived by us as pilgrims on the way ought not to be placed in our formal conceptions as if they are distinguished among themselves by [our] reason alone (for this is false because they are really distinguished among themselves, seeing that one is an action by the intellect by which I conceive the goodness of God, and the other by which I conceive of his justice). Instead that distinction ought to be placed in the divine attributes themselves, not indeed precisely, as if they are in God, but as they are conceived by us through diverse actions. I explain this from those things which have already been said. God is one most-simple being, simultaneously essence, intellect, will, justice, and mercy. We are not able in this life to apprehend this most simple being through one formal concept. For we apprehend by one concept essence, by another intellect, another will, another justice, another mercy: And so, by our various concepts, really distinct among themselves, various objective concepts correspond according to a part of God, not really, but nevertheless, virtually being distinct among themselves. For the essence of God, as it has the nature of an essence, is one objective concept. Likewise, that same divine essence, as it has the nature of an intellect, is another objective concept; and so, about the others. But these objective concepts, although they are indivisible in God, nevertheless are virtually or eminently distinct, and for that reason we are able to apprehend them by distinct formal concepts.
5. Hence it is clear that those words by which we signify the divine essence and attributes such as by the words “essence,” “intellect,” and “will” are not completely synonymous because although they do not signify some perfections actually distinct from the nature of the thing, nevertheless they signify virtual distinctions and [distinctions] by reason. Indeed, virtually from the nature of the thing, but by reason with respect to our diverse formal concepts. Moreover, it is clear how our intellect truly and not falsely conceives God in this life through diverse formal concepts. For although in God there is only one actual objective concept, nevertheless there are many concepts virtually or eminently. Hence, by each of our formal concepts by which we inadequately apprehend God as if he were divided, they correspond to each individual concept, not indeed actually, but virtually distinct among themselves; which is adequate for saving truth and the distinction of our formal concepts. It is similar with regard to the rational soul, in which, as it were, in one simple form there is actually one objective concept, which concept is nevertheless multitudinous virtually and eminently. For these three levels, intellectual being, sensitive being, and vegetative being, are not actually distinguished in the rational soul from the nature of the thing, but nevertheless virtually and eminently; and therefore, by the distinct concepts, we are able to apprehend them without any error or falsity.
6. You may ask: Since apprehension is one thing but judgement is another, whether we are able without error to apprehend the divine attributes through distinct formal concepts, so also, without falsity, to judge the divine attributes to be distinct from each other. I respond: We are entirely able! And indeed for a twofold reason. [First,] if we should judge them as distinct, as they are in God, indeed not actually but virtually, this is most true. Secondly, if we should judge them to be distinct as they are conceived by us not from the nature of the thing but nevertheless rationally this is also most true. This point is able to be shown in some manner by the example of the physical world. For if you ask whether without falsity I am able to judge the eighth part of the sky in which there are stars to be divisible in itself, this should be answered with a distinction. If that sky is seen as it is from the part of a thing, without a doubt it is actually one and indivisible. But if it is seen as apprehended by us with our physical eye, it is thus divisible and complex because we do not comprehend the canvass of the sky with one glance, but its various parts with various glances. Therefore, in the first way, we truly judge it to be one and indivisible. In the latter way, divisible and complex, not indeed in itself, but in relation to our distinct visions.