Martin Becanus on the Infinity of God (Part 2)
Contra the Arminian, Conrad Vorstius and other arguments.
5. Third, he reasons thus: No creature is infinite, therefore neither is God. Indeed, this is incredibly stupid. In the same way as if I should say that no creature is omnipotent, therefore neither is God. Other authors more rightly conclude the opposite from created things in this way: Finite creatures are in the genus of being, because they lack some perfection or grade of perfection in the genus of being. For there is no creature which has within itself all the perfections and all the grades of perfection which are possible in the extent of being[ness]. Therefore, from the contrary, for that reason, God is infinite in the genus of being because he lacks no perfection or grade of perfection among the whole complex of being. This argument is the best and is able to be explained by this twofold syllogism.
6. The first is: to whom [or which] some perfection or grade of perfection is wanting in the genus of being, to that creature [or thing] something more perfect is able to be given in the genus of being. Therefore, it is not infinitely perfect. But each and every creature lacks some perfection or grade of perfection in the genus of being. For the elements lack life; plants and beasts lack intelligence; angels and human beings lack the power to create. In a word, each created thing lacks independence from another created thing. For all creatures depend upon God for their existence and continued existence [esse & conservari]. No creature is independent or sufficient in itself. Therefore, all are finite and limited in perfection.
7. The second is: to whom there is wanting no perfection or grade of perfection in the genus of being, nothing more perfect is able to be given to it in the genus of being. Therefore, it is infinitely perfect in the genus of being. But God lacks no perfection or grade of perfection in the genus of being. For no perfection is able to be conceived or imagined which is not in God either formally or eminently. Formally, if is it uncreated; eminently, if created or creatable. This whole argument proceeds from the prior one. For it demonstrates the root of infinity in God and finiteness in the creatures. For, for this reason, God is infinite in his perfection because he lacks no perfection. For this reason, finite creatures are finite because they lack something.
8. Fourth, Vorstius continues in this way: The power of God is not extended to impossible things: Therefore, he is not infinite; Therefore, neither is his essence infinite. This is not less stupid than the previous argument. Does this newbie think that power will be infinite if it extends itself to impossible things? No, it would not be a power, if it became that sort of power. For just as a science is not called a science except insofar as it respects a thing knowable; so, neither is a power a power unless it respects a possible thing. From this, therefore it ought to be thought that a greater or lesser power is extended to more or less possible. For impossible things do not fall under a power; and if they were to fall under a power, they would not be impossibles.
9. Fifth, he thus concludes: To be actually infinite and to be a something are contradictories. God is actually a something; therefore, he is not actually infinite. I already said that a thing is actually infinite in the genus of being which actually contains within itself all the possible perfections in the genus of being. God, although he is actually something, nevertheless simultaneously actually contains in himself all the possible perfections in the genus of being. Therefore, although he is actually something, nevertheless he is at the same time actually infinite. Therefore, these two things are not contradictory: to actually be infinite and to actually be something. I add that these two things also do not fight with each other: God is actually something and God is actually all things. For formally he is something; eminently he is all things.
10. Enough about Vorstius. Two other objections which the Scholastics are accustomed to propose for the sake of training remain. The first is that if God were infinitely good, it would follow that absolutely nothing would be bad in the nature of things, because one opposite thing, if it is infinite, thoroughly destroys the other. But there are many bad things in the nature of things. Therefore, God is not an infinite good. I respond: Only this follows, that in God himself there is not able to be any bad, given that there is infinite good in him. But outside of God there is able to be bad, because in that place there is finite good. You might ask whether that bad which is outside of God is able to be thoroughly destroyed by God. Some say yes, because since God is an infinite and free agent, he is able to destroy anything which is contrary to himself. But every bad thing is contrary to himself. Therefore, every bad is able to be destroyed. But one should make a distinction. For God is able to destroy every bad of an offense, that is, every sin; but not every bad of nature, that is, every lack of goodness or perfection. For he is not able to give to creatures his own infinite goodness, and so there always remains in them some lack of goodness.
11. Second objection. If God were of infinite perfection, then all creatures would be equally perfect. The latter is false: Therefore, also the former. The major premise is clear because any creature is said to be more or less perfect just as such a creature is more or less different from the perfection of God, seeing that the perfection of God is the measure of the remaining perfections. If therefore, the perfection of God is infinite, all the remaining perfections will be infinitely different from it. Therefore, all will be equally different. Therefore, all will be equal. I respond: The measure of created perfection is not measured from the distance of divine perfection, but from the more or less grades of perfection, which [grades] everything participates from God.