Martin Becanus on Divine Simplicity (Part 2)
Summa Theologiae Scolasticae (Lyon, 1620).
6. What Vorstius objects to, saying that the divine persons are really distinct among themselves, is indeed true, but irrelevant [nihil ad rem]. For we do not ask here whether there is in God some real distinction which effects a real multitude or plurality (about which no one doubts except Sabellius), but instead, whether in God there are some real components which effect real composition. The divine persons are indeed really distinguished; but they are not external components which concur with the composition of some thing.
7. Second conclusion. In God, beyond the divine substance, there are no real accidents which inhere in that substance, and thus there is no real composition from subject and accident. Thus Augustine de Trin. book 5, c. 4, 5, 16. Thomas q. 3. art. 6 and others elsewhere, with the exception of the New Vorstius. And this is proved by three reasons, of which the first is taken from the infinity of the divine substance, the second is conceded by Vorstius, and the third from its foundations. The first reason is this: That which is infinitely perfect in itself is not able to be further perfected in itself. The divine substance is infinitely perfect in itself as was shown above in ch. 5. Therefore, it is not able to be further perfected in itself. But it would be perfected in itself if it received real accidents in itself which are certain real perfections. The major premise is clear because what is infinitely perfect in itself contains in itself all possible perfections, whether formally or eminently. Therefore, it is not able to be further perfected. Moreover, every defect and imperfection is excluded from it. Therefore, even every passive potency or receptivity [is excluded], given that such potency supposes a lacking of something or defect. Therefore, it is not able to receive in itself any other perfection. Therefore, neither any accidents.
8. The Second Reason. Whatever perfection or goodness is in creatures is wholly in God by way of a simple form, as Vorstius clearly and rightly concedes (although unintentionally). But in creatures there is some substantial perfection and accidental perfection. Therefore, this is wholly in God by way of a simple form. Again, that simple form is not able to be a composite of substance and accident, for in that case it would not be simple. Nor is a simple form accidental, since, in that case, God would not be a substance. Therefore, he is a simple substantial form, and hence there is no accident in God.
9. Reason Three. Vorstius, who asserts that there are accidents in God, defends his claim on these grounds. First, because the free decrees of God are in God himself. This he proves thus: Every action is in an agent. The free decrees of God are actions of God. Therefore, they are in God. Second, on the grounds that these kinds of decrees do not make up the substance of God, but are accidents really distinct from his substance. He proves this point in this way: The decrees of God are many because the decree to predestine is one, the decree to reprobate is another, the decree to create still another. But the substance of God is one. Therefore, the decrees of God are not the substance of God. Therefore, there are accidents. Third, because the decrees of God are produced before the creation of the world. He leaves this without attempting to prove it. Fourth, that the decrees of God are not co-eternal with God, but posterior to the order of time. This he proves thus: Every free cause is antecedent its own effect in the order of time or duration; For a free action of the will necessarily assumes deliberation in the intellect; For the one who freely decides to do something, first deliberates, before he decides. But God is the free cause of his own decrees: Therefore, his own decrees precede in time and duration. Therefore, the decrees of God are unable to be co-eternal with God. These things are fundamental to Vorstius. But most are false and imaginary, as I will at the right moment show. (see c. 11. Q. 4 and 5).