Louis Le Blanc On Reprobation in the Reformed School (Theses 44-47)
William Perkins on Reprobation. Infralapsarians on Reprobation. The cause/distinguishing factor of Reprobation.
1-6. 7-11. 12-16. 17-23. 24-29. 30-36. 37-43.
44. But Perkins, although he otherwise affirms with those doctors who are called supralapsarians, that the whole decree of reprobation precedes in God every consideration of sin in reprobated men, and thus that there is no reason or motive able to be assigned on the part of man [for that decree], but that it should be referred to sole will of God; he still thinks that that act of the divine will, by which certain people are ordained to punishment has in God a certain prevision and consideration of sin. For he teaches that there is a twofold act of the decree of reprobation. First, according to him, is the decree of deserting certain men, and of proclaiming his justice among them. Concerning this act, he affirms that outside of God, one is not able to give an impulsive cause, because, as he thinks, it arises from the mere good-pleasure of God, having no respect to either good or bad in creatures. He says that the second act of reprobation is an ordination to punishment or a lawful death. But he again distinguishes this ordination, according to the various ways of thinking, into simple and comparative [ordination]. Simple ordination for him is an ordination by which that person (think Judas or Cain) is ordained to punishment. And this, he says, is brought about by God with respect to original or actual sins, and that such sin in the divine foreknowledge rationally precedes [that ordination], although he denies that it follows from this that sin is a cause of the decree of damnation. But he says that comparative ordination is that by which one, rather than another, both in an equal condition, is ordained to punishment. And he asserts of this comparative reprobation that its cause is the mere will of God, even without respect to any sin.
45. He seems to err in this point. If indeed, to the extent that he himself assumed, that just as God damned men on account of sin, so he decreed to damn them on account of sin, so we are able to assume that just as God damns this one rather than that one because this one rather than that one died in his sins, so also, he decreed to damn this one rather than that one because he foresaw this one rather than that one would die in his sin.
46. What pertains to those to whom the object of reprobation is fallen man, corrupted in sin, is that all agree that God sentenced no one to be damned by his own eternal decree except on account of his foreseen sin, and on account of his future sin. Indeed, from that doctrine it clearly follows that the whole preceding decree of reprobation in God has some consideration of future sins hereafter in reprobated man.
47. Nevertheless, regarding the question of whether the decree of reprobation has some cause in man which urged God to reprobate this or that person, the great majority of them respond with the following distinction. Namely, as was already observed, they distinguish two acts in the decree of reprobation. One is negative, by which God decreed to pass over certain men in the communication of saving grace and eternal glory (which he destined to the elect). But the other is positive, by which he determined to judge them to the eternal punishments of hell. And they deny that there can be found a cause in the merits of man for that first act, but instead they assert that it ought to be assigned to the sole will of God. But concerning the second, positive and affirmative act, by which certain men are destined to eternal damnation, they admit that a cause ought not to be assigned to the sole will of God, but to the foreseen sins of those who are foreseen to have earned that punishment. Nearly all of the theologians who were at the Synod of Dordt unanimously taught this doctrine. This can be seen in their Judicia which are found subjoined to the Canons in the Acts of that Synod.