Le Blanc on Free Choice in General (Reformed Positions)
Theological Theses about Human Free Choice in General, in which the doctrine of the Reformed schools is explained.
I. Many doctors of the Roman church are accustomed to attribute to Calvin and others who religiously agree with him that they take away free choice from man and rob him of every liberty in acting, or at least teach that free choice in man was completely lost and destroyed by sin. One can see this in the Jesuit [Guillaume] Baile in his [Controversiarum] Catechismus, which Rivet refutes (Summa Controversiarum, tract 4, q. 4). There he argues against the Reformed as if they simply deny man’s free choice. This can also be seen in another Jesuit, Martinus Becanus, who says that the Lutherans and Calvinists affirm that free choice was wholly destroyed by the sin of our first parents (Summa Theol. Scholast., Tract 1, ch. 2, q. 9).
II. But it is the consistent position of all the Reformed that free choice considered simply, and according to its proper nature and essence, is something which cannot be separated from the rational creature. And therefore, the faculty of acting freely was not completely taken away from man through sin. On the contrary, man corrupted by sin does not do what he does less freely than he did before sin: he has either been left to himself to indulge sin—clearly to do such with the highest freedom; or if moved and excited by grace, he is desirous of the better life—those acts also being free, and the efficacy of God’s grace does not undermine the validity of his free will.
III. It is also agreed among them that free choice, which is inseparable from man, is neither an act nor some habit, but rather a certain faculty of the soul. Nevertheless, that faculty does not denote something distinct from the mind and will, but these harmonize with the free choice of man, insofar as he has been gifted with intellect and will.
IV.But they do not all explain in the same way where the center of this liberty lies of which man is said to be free in doing and by which his free choice is named. And first, indeed, there are not a few of the Reformed who teach that that freedom with respect to which man is said to be free is neither simply opposed to servitude nor necessity, but rather coercion. And many speak as if coercion alone destroys freedom, and they describe freedom as immunity from coercion.
V. Yet, they do not think that whatever is spontaneously done, and not from coercion, are free actions. For they acknowledge that animals spontaneously act, and yet are robbed of freedom. Therefore, for there to be freedom, there is additionally required that the one who acts is led not simply by the impulse of one’s own nature but acts from deliberation and reason. Therefore, in their mind, the definition of freedom will be complete if someone says that it is immunity from coercion in the one who acts from a judgement of reason.
VI. Accordingly, Marcus Wendelin defines free choice as “an affection of the will which by its own proper motion, without coercion, it chooses or rejects a thing shown to the intellect” (Christianae Theologiae, book 1, ch. 5, explanation of thesis 18). Ursinus also gives a similar definition to this: “Therefore, free choice is a faculty or potency of willing, nilling, choosing, or rejecting an object shown to the intellect by its own motion, without coercion” (Explicationum Catecheticarum, part I, q. 8).
VII.But from this position it follows that liberty properly consists in that freedom by which the will follows the judgement of the intellect, but [it does] not [consist] in some indifference of the will, or a certain power to opposites, without which free choice is able to consist; although the will is indifferent to many of its acts, as Wendelin teaches in the same citation above. There, after he had already laid down his definition of free choice, he adds, “this in general suffices for the freedom of the will. For, although some people add that the will, by free choice, remains in its own nature capable to choose the opposite or to suspend an action does not apply to free choice in general. This is because freedom of choice remains even without an indifference to opposites, which they call freedom of contrariety. Therefore, there is also a freedom which has been determined to one of two things; just as in the blessed, who act freely in such a way that they are not able to do evil by their having been confirmed in the good. Indeed, not even a freedom of contradiction is simply necessary for free choice, because God freely praises the blessed, who nevertheless cannot not praise them.
VIII. Therefore, although he, and those who think likewise with him, recognize that there is a distinction between the acts of the will, namely, that for some [acts] the will is determined, but with respect to others it remains by its nature capable of opposites; yet they consider that the will, both with regard to the latter and the former, must be called free, and that both the latter and the former are freely produced and elicited by the will. And hence they do indeed distinguish between simply voluntary acts and those acts which arise from election. But they do not distinguish between voluntary acts and free acts. For they think both are equally extensive, and whatever is voluntary is, by that very fact, free. They do not think any necessity which does not overturn the nature of the voluntary overturns the nature of freedom. Therefore, although God is by nature good, they nevertheless teach that he is freely good because he is not coercively good but voluntarily good. This is what we see in Zachary Ursinus in the aforementioned place: “That is called free which is ἑκούσιον, that is, spontaneous, and that is opposed to ἀκουσίῳ, that is, what is involuntary and coerced, but not to that which is ἀναγκαίῳ or necessary; for that which is ἑκούσιον may agree and harmonize with ἀναγκαίῳ, but not with ἀκουσίῳ, as God and the holy angels are ἀναγκαίως, that is necessarily good, but not ἀκουσίως, that is, involuntarily or forced, but most free, because they have the principle of their goodness in themselves, namely, free will.”
XI. But others expressly and distinctly affirm that that freedom by which a person is said to be free in his acting is not immunity from coercion alone, which is a necessity that the power of an external agent exerts against that person’s inclination, which is said to be “forced;” but such freedom is additionally opposed to a natural necessity or a determination by nature to one thing. Moreover, that necessity, which they call natural, arises from matter according to them, and that in a twofold way. For either an external action does not depend upon any internal action by which it is ruled; yet, supposing the faculty and material object extrinsically moving it [towards something], it is impossible for the action not to be exercised—and indeed such and so great an action. Whatever is without sense and reason is made the subject of this necessity. Or an external action does indeed depend upon the command of an internal action so that it is able both to be suspended, and also not always able to come about in the same way, but nevertheless [it will not occur] unless the determination arises from some material thing; Just as this happens in animals, whose external actions depend upon and are commanded by sense and admit a great variety, even around one and the same object, just as their senses are influenced variously, both internally and externally; yet their sense itself is always moved and determined from some material object. But a human being is immune from both those kinds of necessity. For in those acts, with respect to which one is said to have free choice, a human being is not said to be determined by external matter moving it [towards acting] or even by material sense alone. But given that he is an intellectual agent, he acts and desires from the judgment and command of reason.
X. On this they establish freedom of the will. And this is because they who act from a judgment of reason have an awareness of an end, and they have determined beforehand for themselves that end, and directed and accommodated their actions to that end. And so, they are in some sense masters of their own actions. Whereas, contra inanimate things, and brutish animals which are led by sense alone, they do not know their own end. And therefore, they do not move themselves to that end, but like slaves they merely press on towards that end, indeed doing what is commanded, but being ignorant of why they are commanded and to what end. Moreover, they do not so much act on account of an end as they are driven to an end by a superior agent. Add to this that the sense and appetite of animals is bound to material things; but the will of man, since it follows the leading of the mind and reason, which has for its object not only sensible things, but also intelligible things, not only present things, but also future things, considers all good things, means and steps, without any limits (as I might say): from which arises the greatest variety of appetites, choices, and external actions.
XI.One can see these things extensively dealt with in Josué de la Place, who was Professor at the Academy of Saumur a few years ago,in his tract on the free choice of man.In that place he thus concludes what he had previously discussed about this subject. “Therefore the natural freedom of the will consists in this, that given that it is free from coercion, and a necessity of matter, and of sensible things, it is able in every place and time to have as its object both immaterial and material things, intelligible and sensible things, present and future things, good and useful or pleasing things,and their contraries, and thus all the orders, grades, and relations of goods and evils, and it is able to choose a final end, intermediate ends, and the means conducing to those ends according to choice, that is, according to the judgment of the practical mind, without which there is indeed no rationality, still less freedom.” And afterwards he repeats his own position that not all necessity conflicts with the will, that is with free choice, “but only to the extent that it is either by coercion, or by material without sense, or sense without reason.” Similarly, freedom is found “in immunity from a threefold necessity, namely of coercion, determination from matter, and determination from sense.”
XII. But there are those who think that immunity from coercion, the necessity of determination from matter, or from sense is not sufficient for the freedom of human actions; But such freedom also excludes any natural necessity, even if it does not arise either from matter or sense. Nor do they think that, for an action to be free, it is sufficient that a person acts, in whatever way, from a judgment of reason. For such an act to be free, what is also required is such judgment which is the conclusion of a certain deliberation and consultation. And thus, given that certain acts of our will are determined to those acts by nature, and around which acts no one ever consults or deliberates, such as the act by which we wish to be blessed, or the act by which we wish to avoid being miserable—they do not think that around these acts the will is free. Nor does it have the mode of a free cause even with respect to those motions which are suddenly excited in the will by some violent commotion before our mind is able to collect itself and begin some deliberation. Whence it is that they distinguish between free and willing, and claim that willing is wider a term than free; seeing that willing is not always free.
XIII. This is the doctrine of Andre Rivet, once a Professor at the Academy of Leiden (Summa Controversiarum, tract. 4, q. 3), “We acknowledge that the ground of freedom is unable to agree with coercion properly so-called, nor with a natural necessity by which an agent is determined to one thing by nature. Nor does it suffice for liberty if a person voluntarily does something, which even occurs with natural causes; but a previous deliberation is necessary, and a judgment of reason, which have no place where there is a determination from a necessity of nature.” And afterwards he says, “We distinguish these three things in liberty, by which we explain the nature of free choice per se. 1. That there is freedom without coercion in the subject, namely in the will, which always acts spontaneously, from its own internal principle, without deliberation and consultation; but [when it acts] with consultation and deliberation, [it acts] freely without necessity. Without the first freedom, the nature of the will by coercion, imposing a necessity upon the will such that it cannot act voluntarily, [or] as they say, by an elicited act. Moreover, without deliberation from indifferent things, the intellect is not able to will freely, namely if its nature were determined to one effect.” And for this reason, along with Thomas, he calls it an elective power. And with Bellarmine he acknowledges that the essence of free choice relates to the fact that anyone has the option [to choose] diverse things, and [that] choice is made with a full and perfect judgment of reason.
XIV. On this point, the teaching of Moses Amyraut, recently a professor at the Academy of Saumur, is similar (Tractatus de libero hominis arbitrio, pgs. 61ff.). There he distinguishes a twofold motion of the will. One which is not separate from that cognition which has its origin from reason, but is nevertheless such that the cognition by which it is born and blossoms does not arise from a previous consultation. The other, which not only is conjoined with some cognition, but arises from that idea which precedes a προβούλευσις, that is, a previous deliberation, and which is nothing else than a conclusion which is produced from deliberation, namely by contemplating and comparing several objects among themselves, or by looking at one and the same object in different ways, such that the mind for some time, swung here and there by the weights of reasonings, finally is inclined to one side. Then he observes that that motion of the will which follows no consultation and deliberation of the mind still is twofold, namely that the will is itself brought through one motion to an end, that is, blessedness and happiness; by another motion [it is brought] to the means which are thought to lead to that end.
XV. But afterwards he shows that neither of these motions pertain to free choice. Not the first, because free choice is what Aristotle called προαίρεσις. He says, “But some previous deliberation comes before every προαίρεσις. Moreover, no one consults about that ultimate end, but is carried to it not merely necessarily, but also ἀπροβουλεύτως.” Not the second either because although that motion differs from the previous one, it also is equally ἀπροβούλευτος like the other. Since it is so sudden, so immediate, either arising from some commotion or born by the presence of some unnatural, unforeseen, and unexpected object, it bursts forth such that it acts before every consultation. Whence it is concluded that a motion of this kind is indeed ἑκούσιον, that is, spontaneous and voluntary, but not προαιρετικὸν, that is, free and elective. And for this reason, it is rightly accustomed to be said that the first impulses of our passions are not in our power, because those alone are in our power about which we consult, whether those impulses by us are either seized upon or ignored. And hence we do not judge all those things which come before every deliberation to be within our power. So, he similarly concludes (pg. 65): “Therefore, it remains that those things about which we are able to deliberate are thought to pertain to our free choice, and about those things we thus deliberate about, we say that they likewise proceeded from our free choice, as appetite follows deliberation and consultation. We have often said that the essence of free choice is grounded upon this προαίρεσιν.”
XVI. But beyond a necessity which is from coercion, whether from matter, or from sense, or from any other natural determination, there is a certain necessity which is thought to arise from some external cause, like from God himself, thus moving or impelling the faculty itself such that it imposes a true necessity of acting, that is, it takes away the power of doing otherwise from the agent—even though the one who acts is thought to act spontaneously and not compulsively. This necessity the schoolmen call impulsive and moving. But there are some among the Reformed who think that this necessity also conflicts with human freedom, and they think that [human freedom] is not able to coexist with any properly-speaking necessity, which necessity is called in the schools a necessity of the consequent, as opposed to a necessity which they call of consequence.
XVII. This is the position of William Ames, once a theologian in the Academy of Franeker, who says, “We admit that free choice, when it acts, is free from all necessity so that it cannot properly act necessarily with regard to the exercise of its own act, although with respect to the divine ordination, it certainly and infallibly acts.” (Bellarminus Enervatus, tome 4, book 4, ch. 1).
XVIII.Robert Baron, once Professor at the Academy of Aberdeen, thinks the same in his MetaphysicaGeneralis ad Theologiae Usum Accommodata, where among many other things he asserts these two things:First, the will in its own elicited acts is not bound or constrained by a so-called absolute necessity, which they call a necessity of the consequent. Next, the will, even of fallen man, is bound by no impulsive or moving necessity with respect to God. He says, “He [i.e., God] also gave to people a free will and by consequence he did not totally take away that faculty by imposing upon it a necessity either by his eternal decree or by a temporary motion and inflection.” (Sect. 12, disp. I about free choice, num. 17).
XIX. Moreover, in order to explain what also seems clear to me, I think that the first position which defines free choice as “immunity from coercion in the person who acts from a judgement of reason,” really does not differ from the second position, which not only opposes liberty to coercion, but also from a necessity which arises from matter or sense, which others call a physical necessity. Given that it is said that immunity from coercion is not worthy of the name freedom, except in the person who uses reason, clearly it assumes that for there to be liberty, there needs to be an agent following the judgment of reason, but not determined by matter or sense. And thus, this second position does not differ from the first, except that it is more clearly and fully expressed.
XX. Moreover, it is annoying that, in both positions, they altogether confound freedom and willingness, and think that all acts of the will are free. For according to the common sense of man and the normal way of speaking, that alone is said to be free to us which is in our power, which is able to do otherwise, and about which we can consult and deliberate. Now, as we said above, there are certain acts of the will to which the will is determined by nature such that it cannot do otherwise and about which no deliberation can be found. Add to this the fact that all acts which proceed freely from us can be subject to certain precepts and commanded or prohibited by some divine or human law. But that fact in no way works with those laws around which the will plainly has an immutability, such that in no state was it or is it able ever to do otherwise. Finally, since those with whom we are dealing admit and acknowledge that there is a large distinction between acts of the will, namely, some are acts which are in our power such that we are able to consult and deliberate about them; and there are those acts, according to the various judgements of the practical intellect, we are able to do, disregard, or even do the contrary. But the case is clearly different regarding other acts. Why do they not want things which are distinct by nature also to be signified with distinct words, and [so] according to the received use in the schools, call the former free and the latter voluntary? Especially given that wise people do not depart from a common way of speaking without necessity!
XXI. Moreover, among those learned men who seem to confound freedom and willingness, there are some who warn that freedom of the will or free choice is understood in a twofold way—loosely or strictly. Freedom of the will in general or taken loosely, according to them, is nothing else than intellectual willingness, intellectual spontaneity, that is, spontaneity by a preceding light or judgment of the intellect. Therefore, that general freedom of the will properly consists in the fact that the will has its own dominion to such an extent that it can in no way be forced, but moves itself, restrains itself, acts or does not act as it pleases, on account of a certain reason, consideration, or judgment.
XXII. This is that freedom which according to their position the will exercises in all its actions, and it does this not only when it treats of means considering an end, or those things which conduce little or nothing to an end, but also when it treats an end itself. And hence that necessity which follows the nature of the will, and is consistent with it, and by which it is determined to pursue the highest end, does not overturn or minimize this freedom of the will.
XXIII. But freedom or free choice taken more strictly, is restricted, as they confess, to means related to an end or to those things which conduce barely or nothing to an end, and pertains to those things which are in our power and are defined rightly by Aristotle as a spontaneity arising from previous deliberation, or a deliberative appetite of those things which are in our power. In this sense, acts are called free which are merely contingent, and which are able to be done or not done by us according to our choice. And in this respect, freedom includes a certain indifference, and the will is not in another way free than insofar as it is indifferent, namely when it is able to act or not act regarding the same object, and when it is able to choose something rather than another thing or its opposite. And in this sense, God does not freely love himself because by a necessity of nature he wills and loves himself; neither does a man freely will to be happy, and not wish to be miserable, because he so wills, and not otherwise, by a certain natural necessity.
XXIV. This is the teaching of John Strang, Doctor and Primary Professor of Sacred Theology at the University of Glasgow in his book De Voluntate et Actionibus Dei circa Peccatum, book 3, chapter 14. There, after he explained and widely discussed these things which we have said, he says that he does not deny that the term free choice can be rightly used in that strict sense although in another and looser sense, he affirms that all the actions of the will are free. And also, in a similar way, the most celebrated Alexander Morus distinguishes free choice, (De Gratia & libero Arbitrio, disputation 1, thesis 28). There he provides two definitions, one of free choice broadly understood, the other of free choice strictly understood. According to the first notion free will is described by him as “the quality of intelligent nature most proper to it by which it wills or rejects nothing except what it understands to be good or evil.” But according to the second, “the will insofar as it chooses the means shown to it after consultation by the intellect.”
XXV. Whence it is clear, as Strang acknowledges in the place cited, that there is a mere logomachy between those who affirm that all actions of the will are free, and between those who deny [all actions] are free. For those who affirm the former take freedom loosely for that willingness by which the will voluntarily follows the judgment of the intellect, in which sense there is no one who denies that every action of the will is altogether free. But those who deny the former, understand freedom as that natural indetermination and indifference which coincides with the will regarding those acts which fall under deliberation and consultation. In this sense it is obvious and conceded by all that the will is not free with respect to some of those acts. But given that that wider meaning of freedom is less used and accepted, when we speak simply, as far as is possible, it is altogether fitting that we deny rather than affirm that the will is free in those acts around which it exercises only the first [freedom], but not the latter and strictly sense of freedom.
XXVI. Moreover, the third position seems unduly timid insofar as it does not dare to claim the freedom of human actions from all necessity properly so-called—lest anything prejudice the immutability of the divine decrees, the efficacy of divine grace, and the determination of the will by the judgment of practical reason. For as its own efficacy harmonizes with divine providence and grace, and its own power and immutability with the divine decrees, and so also its own decisions in the will with the mind, it is not necessary to subordinate the free will of man to any properly so-called necessity, as the most-learned men among the Reformed, and we also with them, if God should allow us, hope to show.
XXVII. Therefore, with Ames and Robert Baron, we do not fear to say that the freedom of human choice is opposed to whatever necessity properly speaking, nor is any human act if we speak strictly and properly to be free unless we place in man a power to do otherwise, or at least to suspend his own act, and to cease from action. For by the word necessity properly speaking we understand that which so determines an agent to a certain action that a true and intrinsic power of not doing and doing otherwise does not remain in him.
XXVIII. Therefore, the freedom of man in acting is not wrongly grounded in one’s certain indifference and indetermination around his own acts. But it should be observed that such an indifference is not understood, as some people seem to suppose, as an unsettled state of a person wavering, and uncertain about which way to turn. But [it is understood as] a true power of acting, or not acting, or to direct one’s action this way or that; which also remains in the person who has determined, by his own judgment and election, these or those actions, and with whom it is certain and has been established to do this and not another thing.
XXIX. Hence that vulgar definition, according to which human freedom is established on the grounds that with all things posited for acting, a person is able to act or not to act, to do this or that, although some people abuse that [definition], yet it is able to have a good and apt sense. For in all deliberative actions, which are alone strictly and properly free, a man not only before he acts, but even while he acts, has a true and real potency not to do or to do otherwise. Indeed, a man is not able to do two opposites simultaneously, or simultaneously both do and cease from an action; but nevertheless, when he does this [thing], a power remains in him to do an opposite act, or to cease from that action. The Scholastics say there is in free choice a simultaneity of potency to opposites, but not a potency of simultaneity, that is, a power to hold opposites simultaneously. The reason for this is because a potency to one act is not opposed to a potency to the negation of that act or to a contrary act. But two contraries or contradictory things are not able to exist simultaneously in the same subject.
XXX. Besides the authors of the fourth position, John Strang acknowledges this position in that third book already cited, ch. 15. For although he denies this to be the definition of freedom in general, nevertheless he admits that it is compatible with free choice more strictly understood, in as much as, notwithstanding the prerequisites to acting, an active indifference to it remains by which it is immune to all antecedent necessity, whether that comes from divine predetermination, or whether from the nature of the will itself, and a certain condition of the object (pg. 698). But that stricter definition of freedom is used most regularly, and for that reason it ought to be thought most appropriate. He explains this matter in this way (pg. 696): “In things relating to an end, or in indifferent things, in which it is not necessary that the intellect judge those things as having a necessary connection with a common good, it is true in the divided sense, both of elicited and commanded actions, that the will, not only with all things prerequisite to an action posited, but even when the will is determined, whether by God or by itself, to act and while it acts, retains the power to do this or that or to act and not act. And hence in such matters, the will remains free and acts entirely free not only before it is determined and acts, but also while it is determined and acts, because even when it acts, it retains an ability by which it is able not to act, although hypothetically what is determined or done is cannot but be done, because whatever is, supposing that it is, necessarily is, although it is simply a contingent act. Therefore, after a divine determination has been posited, whether by effective grace or for some other reason, a necessity of the consequence is obviously inferred, because that act of the will infallibly follows what has been determined by God. But it is not a necessity of the consequent, because its nature remains contingent.
XXXI. Andre Rivet also does not disapprove of defining free choice as “a faculty of the will, by which, with all prerequisite things for acting posited, it is able to act or not to act.” But this should be understood in the divided sense, not the compounded sense. “Namely, if anyone says that with all antecedent requisites posited, according to the order of reason or of time to an act, free will is able to operate or not operate, in such a way that with those same prerequisites there exists simultaneously in free choice the faculty and power by which it can operate or not operate, if is wishes, as Alvarez distinguishes, because even ‘the efficacious motion of God, by which the will is determined to such an act, does not remove from free choice the faculty of performing that act or of doing a contrary act, but only ensures that when free choice is able to act and not act that such an act acts infallibly, albeit freely.’” These are the words of that most-learned doctor (Summa Controversiarum, tract 4, q. 3). To which he adds that created free choice not only before it is determined to one act, but also in the very moment in which it is determined by God and determines itself to the same act, has at the same time the power to be able to produce a contrary act if it wants, but not to have a contrary act simultaneously, because two contrary acts are not able to exist in the same power, but successively.
XXXII. But especially Ludovicus Crocius while he lived as professor and doctor of theology at the Bremen School, gives this definition of freedom and not another: “freedom of the human will is its natural quality by which it is able to choose for itself something posited by the intellect or sense under the guise of a good, and with all things requisite to acting being posited, it can will to undertake an action or suspend an action” (Syntagma Theologiae, lib. 3, cap. 37, thesis 3). He adds that it is called free choice in the same sense by the ancient fathers. And also in explantion of that same thesis he notes that freedom which is a natural quality of the will, is opposed to necessity whether that be from a compelled external cause or from intrinsic nature absolutely determined to one thing.
XXXIII. However, when freedom is placed in a certain indifference of acting, and on account of this the one who is called free is able to act or not act, to do this or that, it should be carefully noticed that should not be understood in such a way as if it pertains to the essence of freedom that the one who is free is able to do good or do evil. For the ability to do evil is not something that pertains to the perfection of freedom, but it is rather some imperfection accompanying some freedom in the created person, and which is accidental to freedom. For God, who is most free in all his doing, is not able to do evil; Nor are the holy angels able [to do evil] since they were confirmed in grace by God. And this is also the prerogative of the blessed souls, which, once admitted to the vision of God, are not able to sin any longer. Nevertheless, the holy angels or the blessed souls do not lose their own freedom on account of this.
XXXIV. And on the opposite side, the ability to do good, and to do those things which are pleasing and welcome to God is a certain perfection which can be absent from a free agent, with the nature and essence of his freedom remaining safe. Indeed, everyone agrees that freedom in doing remains in demons and angels of darkness, nor did it entirely perish in men judged to eternal damnation by God, and yet neither devils nor damned men are able to do good, and do something which is approved by God. No, not even in this life is a man corrupted by sin and destitute of God’s grace able to supply anything which is actually good and pleasing to God. As our Lord said (John 15:5), “without me you can do nothing,” and consistent with this is the saying of the Apostle (2 Cor. 4:5), “We are not sufficient to think anything by ourselves, as if from ourselves, but our sufficiency is from God.” And nevertheless hardened, and plainly deserted by God, man retains his liberty in acting.
XXXV. Indeed it is repugnant to divine goodness, justice, and wisdom that he would form some intelligent or rational creature, and therefore free, which is not able to do good and which has some implanted necessity to doing bad by God. For the greatest and most excellent God is able to create nothing which is not good. But creatures which were made good by God are able to become bad by sin and guilt, and contract, by doing bad, those habits by which one is so determined to evil that he is no longer able to do good—by the will, namely, hardened in evil, and not prevailing, except by the help of divine grace, to extricate itself from those nooses in which it voluntary hung itself.
XXXVI. Nevertheless a creature, who is thrown into this necessity of doing bad by his own fault, does not for this reason not act freely in those things which he acts badly. For the depraved habits, to which the mind and will is shackled, do not hinder less that by which one consults and deliberates about those things he does, and the will willingly, without any compelled violence, follows the judgment of its crooked reasoning. Indeed, he himself who is not able to do good nevertheless is able to abstain from every individual act, nor is he controlled by any necessity to perform this or that sin. For example, when the Devil by his temptations moves and allures someone such that he would rebel against God and follow the flesh, he is able not to tempt him. And when any man has been hardened and blinded by God’s just judgment, such that he commits some flagrant sin, as murder or adultery, he is able to not pollute himself by that murder or adultery, nor is he able to claim as a pretext any necessity in doing that.
XXXVII. Moreover, with the essence and nature of human freedom explained in this way, it remains to be asked to what human faculty human freedom properly pertains and focuses on. It is the more common position of the doctors of the Reformed churches that human freedom takes its origin from the mind and reason but is, nevertheless, properly an affection of the will. For the fact that man is able to choose among various things and now embrace this and reject others, it follows that he is able to judge about various options and to understand diverse reasons of good and bad in these options. And yet no act is thought to be free in a person unless it is elicited from the will or at least commanded by it. Therefore, acts of the will alone are thought to be free per se. But those exercised by the other faculties are only free insofar as the they depend upon the will, and arise with it either consenting or, at least, disregarding and overlooking them. And this is what the schools say: that freedom is formally in the will alone, but only at root in the intellect. Louis Crocius makes this point in the above cited place. He says, “freedom which is attributed to choice, is properly an affection of the will, although it has its root in the intellect and reason.”
XXXVIII. Yet some others among the Reformed philosophize otherwise about this issue. Of which number is the most illustrious man, Moïse Amyraut. Thus he, as he explains his own position on this question, observes that freedom is granted to three kinds of acts. 1. The acts of those faculties which the will commands. 2. The acts of the will itself. 3. The acts of the intellect. In a first consideration, in his view, freedom is nothing other than the faculty of living, or of doing as you wish. For, insofar as we think we are free, with no compulsion or impediment, we do that which we wish. In a second consideration, freedom is defined by him as “the faculty of willing as we judge something to be willing, and as each person is determined to a thing by his own judgement, not another person’s.” For just as bodily actions are thought to be free because they depend on a free principle, namely the will, so he says that actions of the will are free because they likewise depend on a free principle, namely, on the choice of the intellect. But he says that the freedom of the intellect is founded upon its independent action, that is, in that which the intellect does of itself and by itself and is in its own power, that is, powerful in its own operations, because, namely, it is neither compelled by a power to those exercises nor does it depend on another authority. Thus, freedom with respect to the actions of the mind and intellect is “a power of judging about things in its own power, and which is neither by an external force or authority. That most learned man expounds on this extensively in his little book de libero arbitrio, pgs. 20ff.
XXXIX. From this doctrine, it follows that the liberty which is found in external actions is dependent on the will, but the liberty belonging to acts of will is dependent upon the intellect. The intellect, however, is free in itself, and thus liberty belongs primarily and especially to the intellect, and should be situated there as on its proper and natural seat. Consequently, liberty does not exist formally (as many believe) in the will alone, existing only causally and radically in the intellect, as that most learned man teaches and endeavors to prove on pages 30ff in that little book. His principal argument rests on his judgment that the intellect is naturally more autonomous than the will, since the will follows the guidance of the intellect and is subject to its governance, for which reason the Greeks call it τὸ ἡγεμονικόν [the governing faculty]. He considers it absurd that liberty should exist formally in that faculty which is subject to another’s command, rather than in that faculty which is bound by the laws of no other faculty.
XL. And yet at the end of the same section, he concludes that liberty, properly speaking, exists formally neither in the intellect nor in the will when considered separately, but rather in both faculties taken together. This is because a person is considered free neither simply insofar as he judges, nor simply insofar as he desires, but insofar as he desires according to the judgment and counsel of reason. This is analogous to how humanity exists formally neither in his intellectual soul alone nor in his sensitive nature alone, but in the human being insofar as it is composed of these two natures. Consequently, according to his view, “free choice is not any single one of the rational faculties present in humans, nor is it something of which one part belongs more to the intellect and another more to the will. Rather, it is that innate quality and disposition of both faculties—namely, the intellect and will—according to which they contribute, each according to its own nature, to human actions, such that a human being, insofar as he is human, is considered free. However, just as in the definition of a human being, the consideration of reason far excels that of animal nature, so in the definition of free choice, the principle of the intellect seems far superior to that of the appetite. For while the capacity to desire is common to many other things, among visible creatures only humans, being uniquely endowed with an intellect, are thought to freely desire.”
XLI. But, he maintains that the intellect, considered in any way whatsoever, is not the principle of liberty in man, but only insofar as it makes pronouncements about matters to be done or desired—and not merely in general, but also in particular cases, such that it either impels a person to action or restrains them from it. In this respect, it is called the practical intellect, which dictates in particular cases what should or should not be done, what should be desired or avoided, here and now. Yet he does not consider just any judgment of the practical intellect sufficient for acting freely; rather, he requires such judgment to be the conclusion of consultation and deliberation. Thus, according to his view, the practical intellect in humans is not the principle of free actions in any simple or general way, but only insofar as it judges about matters to be done after careful deliberation—that is, having first engaged in deliberation and consultation—as can be seen in the cited section, pages 31ff.
XLII. Furthermore, Josué de la Place, also a most learned man and Amyraut’s colleague during his lifetime, shares with him the view that liberty does not exist formally in the will alone, and that not only the will but also the intellect is a free faculty.[1] However, he differs from his colleague in that the latter distinguishes between the liberty belonging to the intellect and the liberty belonging to the will, assigning each its own particular definition. Placeus, on the other hand, maintains that the same liberty by which the will is called free also applies to the intellect. For according to his understanding, this liberty consists in immunity from three types of necessity: namely, coercion, determination by matter, and determination by sense. This immunity, as he judges, belongs equally to the intellect. Moreover, his position opposes the former [Amyraut] view in that, when comparing will and intellect, liberty seems to him to reside more in the will. This is because he considers that the command and dominion in humans belongs more to the will than to the intellect, since the intellect does not move the will by its act as if by a command, but rather by the object it presents to it. Moreover, the will moves and applies the mind to understanding by its act, as if by a command. Nevertheless, this learned man believes that certain acts of our mind are free—and thus morally good or bad—even though they do not arise from the will’s command, nor depend on its consent as their principle. He considers faith and its opposite, heresy, to be acts of this kind, as can be seen in his Opusculis Posthumis tract. de lib. Arbitr. pag. 163. & 164 [pgs. 525–27].
XLIII. The aforementioned celebrated Alexander Morus, in agreement with those learned men, holds that free choice is shared between the intellect and will, as it were, and that free choice is nothing other than the intellect and will insofar as these two faculties work together and are bound to each other by a certain bond or marriage. However, he leaves open the question of in which faculty it primarily consists. “For just as,” he says, “the judgment of the intellect terminates in the will, so the liberty of the will has its root in the intellect.” Thus, according to his view, free choice can be called either the intellect insofar as it moves and affects the will, or the will insofar as it is moved by the intellect. Or, to use Aristotle’s own words, it is either “desiring reason” or “reasoning desire” [ἢ ὀρεκτικός νοῦς, ἢ ὄρεξις διανοητική]. De Gratia & libero arbitrio disp. 1. thes. 21.
XLIV. As far as I am concerned, I hold that no act of any faculty, even of the mind itself in humans, is free unless it depends in some way on the will and occurs either by its command or with some form of its consent—or to put it more clearly, unless it is something that a person could have omitted if they had wished. For who would call an act free on the part of a person if it could not have been done otherwise even if they had greatly wished it, and if their will is not supposed to have contributed to it in any way, whether directly or indirectly, mediately or immediately? And since every free action can fall under a precept and take on the character of virtue or vice, it must proceed in some way from the will. For up to now, Augustine’s opinion has been accepted in the schools by common consensus: that sin does not have the character of sin if it is not voluntary—that is, if the will is not in some way its principle and cause, as the common understanding of the faithful interprets that saying.
XLV. Nevertheless, from this it does not follow that liberty should be said to exist formally in the will alone. For just as every free action owes its origin in some way to the will, so too every free action arises from some mental consultation and deliberation. And just as the intellect freely produces no action that the will could not have prevented, so too no act of the will is free concerning which the mind could not have consulted and deliberated. From this it follows that free actions should be attributed with equal right to both the mind and will, and therefore, if one concludes from this that liberty exists formally in the will, one could equally conclude that it exists formally in the intellect.
XLVI. Rather, it seems to me that liberty exists formally neither in the intellect nor in the will, but in the human being insofar as he acts through the intellect and will. Indeed, properly speaking, liberty is not a property of this or that faculty, but something arising from the mutual relation and cooperation of multiple faculties, and which therefore cannot be properly attributed to any particular faculty, but only to the subject in which these faculties are found. Thus, if we speak precisely, neither the mind nor will should be called free, but rather the human being himself insofar as he uses these faculties in a certain way. When the will is called free, the statement is not, as the schools say, formal, but causal: namely, because the will joined with the intellect is the cause of those actions with respect to which a human is said to act freely. This observation is not entirely trivial, as will be seen in what follows. For it helps resolve certain difficulties in which many become entangled when they seek the entire basis of liberty in the will rather than simply in the human being.
XLVII. Whether the intellect contributes more to human liberty than the will, or the will more than the intellect, is a matter that does not concern the theologian to define, and one whose more precise investigation was neglected even by Aristotle himself, the prince of modern philosophers. Therefore, we too, along with certain most learned theologians, leave this question open.
XLVIII. Although the doctors of the Reformed schools vary among themselves in explaining the nature of liberty and which faculties it does or does not belong to, they nevertheless readily accept the definition of free choice given by Bellarmine in De Gratia & libero Arbitrio lib. 3. cap. 3. Namely, that “Free choice is the free power, attributed or granted to intelligent nature for God’s great glory, of choosing one thing before another from those things which contribute to some end, or of rejecting or accepting one and the same thing according to our judgment.” This can be seen in Robert Baron’s Metaphysica sua generali, sect. 12. Disp. de Libertate Arbitrii, where he not only approves of this definition but also carefully explains it part by part. Paraeus also does not disapprove of this same definition, since after making certain observations about it, he admits that concerning free choice considered absolutely, there is no controversy between us and Bellarmine, writing on the aforementioned passage of Bellarmine. Nor does the definition that he substitutes as being clearer and fuller differ much from Bellarmine’s; namely, that “it is the power of willing, nilling, choosing, [or] rejecting an object shown by the intellect, without coercion, by a spontaneous and deliberate motion, and with the aptitude of the will for willing or nilling opposites.” Similarly, Ames acknowledges that this definition could be interpreted such that there is no reason for contention about it, as stated in Bell. enerv. tem. 4. lib. 4. cap 1.
[1] I have an old note of mine which says cf. Ruiz de Montoya—Ruiz, De Voluntate Dei, 46.9.
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