Disputation on the Ways of Knowing God: Part 1
By Gisbertus Voetius
Respondent: Simon van Houten, Utrecht, Nov. 11, 1665.
§ 1. Christian theologians commonly distinguish theology or the knowledge of God into natural and supernatural [theology]. They further divide natural theology into innate or congenital and acquired. In his 3rd lecture, [Faustus] Socinus denies natural theology and in that same lecture, employing various arguments, argues against it.[1] [Krzysztof] Ostorodt agrees with Socinus in book 1 of his Institutions, pages 1 and 10.[2] [Valentinus] Smalcius departs from Socinus in his 8th disputation against Franzius,[3] and [Jan] Crell in his tract on God’s attributes, which was published in quarto with [Johann] Völkel’s Institutions some years previous in the Dutch Republic (Amsterdam).[4] Conrad Vorstius followed Socinus’ position in his book about God, pg. 128 and in his Apologetica Exegesis, pg. 5.[5] In that first disputation about God, as it was published and presented in 1598, the teachings of Socinus were not considered to be at odds with the common and orthodox position, but [they were] in the notes to that same disputation, published in the year 1610 with the title: Theological Tracts about God.[6] The Remonstrants very clearly were approving of Vorstius. Their six delegates sent by them to the Conference at The Hague in 1611, when asked for their opinion by the Illustrious Estates of Holland, responded that they could find nothing blameworthy in Vorstius’ book about God. Yet, all the teachers throughout the Christian world—Catholics, Protestants, Reformed—saw [the danger in the Socinian views], as demonstrated by the many writings published everywhere against him [i.e., Socinus]. Among other unorthodox views held by Vorstius and the Remonstrants, Reformed ministers pointed out in their second Counter-Remonstrance (presented to the Illustrious Estates of Holland in 1617) and Festus Hommius noted in his Specimen (published in 1618) that these views contradicted Reformed doctrine, particularly the Belgic Confession and Catechism.[7] Among the Remonstrants, Simon Episcopius, one of the three directors of the society of Remonstrants, and the ordinary professor (although privately-funded) of Remonstrant Theology at Amsterdam, alluded to this Socinian-Vorstian view in his private disputations On the Knowledge of God, corollaries 2 and 3.[8] He teaches the same things in book 5 of his Institutions of Theology, chapter 3, although he seems to contradict himself in that same place.[9] His Apology of the Remonstrants, chapter 1, sufficiently makes clear the orthodox Christian position on this point against the Socinians, as Isaac Junius observed in chapter 1 of his Anti-Apology, and discussed at greater length by [Jacob] Trigland [Sr.] in chapter 1 of his Anti-Apology.[10]
§ 2. Hence the heterodox position is opposed to the common doctrine not only of the Protestant and Reformed [churches], but also of all other churches and schools professing religion generally under the name of Christianity. Specifically, Article 2 of our Belgic Confession refutes Socinus’ arguments, along with Johannes Junius in his 1633 Refutation of Socinus’ Lectures, Heinrich Alting in his 1654 Elenctic Theology delivered at Groningen, and Johannes Hoornbeeck in his 1650 Refutation of Socinianism, volume 1, book 1, chapter 7.[11] These same theologians explain distinctly, precisely, and in opposition to the heterodoxy of their adversaries, the common view of our people: that natural knowledge is partly innate, partly acquired: that innate knowledge is also called subjective, while the acquired is called objective. Heinrich Alting teaches that innate knowledge is distinct from acquired knowledge. And Johannes Hoornbeeck warns that Socinus neglects that distinction, and that, therefore, he stumbles at the very threshold of this controversy. That is why Alting poses separate questions about each type of knowledge, proves the affirmative for each with distinct arguments, and responds individually to objections raised against each. Concerning the former, or innate [knowledge], he determines, in the same place, that, “The affirmative thesis of the Orthodox is that there is some natural theology or knowledge of God; or that there is some sense of divinity naturally implanted in man.”[12] The same author in the same place and in his Heidelberg Problems describes this knowledge “as a faculty or potency (not an act) implanted in humans by nature, or at birth, and spontaneously manifesting itself in all adults of sound mind.”[13] And on page 4: “It is naturally inscribed, imprinted, and made evident to human hearts.”[14] On page 6, to the objection that “[all] knowledge is either habitual or actual, but knowledge of God is natural in neither of these ways,” he responds: “This is not a complete enumeration of the species or modes [of such knowledge]: for what is missing is a natural potency or faculty spontaneously manifesting itself in its own time according to the innate light of nature, even without demonstration or external instruction—however much it may afterwards be aroused, increased, and confirmed.”[15] On page 2 of the same work, he qualifies this natural knowledge, [stating] that “in this darkness, which is greatly obscured and imperfect due to sin, it varies according to the condition and quality of the subjects or individuals, whether of single human beings or even of nations and peoples.”[16]
On page 8, he affirms the acquired knowledge of God in accordance with the common view of the orthodox, which he describes as being acquired from God’s works. And he assigns two principles of it, sense and reason, etc.[17] In the same place, from the saying of Dionysius the Areopagite customarily set forth in the schools, he proves and explains the threefold mode of ascending and attaining to the knowledge of God from his works [i.e., via eminentiae, via negationis, and via causationis].[18] Concerning this same acquired knowledge, in the same place he declares that it is “not perfect, but imperfect; neither clear nor distinct, but confused.”[19]
In his Heidelberg Problems he explains it this way. It is called natural:
1. “Not because it was created along with the first man ….”[20]
2. “Nor because it exists in actuality, as if an actual knowledge of God were innate to man, … or by habit, as if some intellectual habit were engendered in him, … but natural both in its source and objectively. In its source, insofar as the power and faculty is innate in all men…. But objectively, because such evident and clear traces of deity are impressed upon the whole world and all its parts….”[21]
It seemed fitting to repeat these points from the renowned theologian Alting:
1. The fact that he has clearly presented and solidly defended the common view of the orthodox, not his own particular view nor others’ against Socinus, Vorstius, and the Remonstrants; As he himself prefaces this formula on page 2 in his thesis on innate knowledge opposed to Socinus: “In contrast, the orthodox teach and defend” etc.[22] In the same place: “The affirmative thesis of the orthodox, therefore, is this.”[23] Likewise concerning the acquired knowledge which he explained and defended on page 9: “The affirmative thesis of the orthodox, therefore, is this: That there is some acquired knowledge of God….”[24]
2. The fact that he is among those who addressed this controversy after it was stirred up by Socinus and his followers on this subject.
3. The fact that my ideas, which I formed under the guidance of my teachers’ living voice and writings, and which I have imparted to others to the best of my ability for so many years, both in writings and speech—both publicly and privately—agree with Alting’s explanation.
§ 3. Meanwhile, anyone who reads these theologians or takes the time to look into and compare them on this occasion will see that Alting has accurately represented the common understanding and consensus of the orthodox in the view he explains there. I will point out some [theologians] for the benefit of the younger ones below. As for myself, I profess that I imbibed that distinction and explanation of natural theology in my academic studies from the lectures of my preceptor Fr[ancis] Gomarus on Romans 1:18–19, his lectures on common places, and his 1609 disputation on Theology put forward with Petrus Lansbergius as the respondent: which can be found re-published among his works.[25] With these writings [of Gomarus] I had joined the reading of Franciscus Junius’ Treatise On Theology, book 1 chapter 5, and book 2 chapter 2.[26] There was also the disputation of Johannes Cuchlinus, regent of the Dutch College, of which part 1 was on the knowledge of God, part 2 on the modes of knowing God, proposed in the year 1605 with Caspar Barlaeus as the respondent.[27] The works of metaphysics, which were then well-used by diligent students—those of Cornelius Martini, [James?] Cheyne, Jacob Martini, [Chrysostomus] Javellus, [Pedro da] Fonseca, especially [that] of Francisco Suárez (from which our teacher Gilbert Jacchaeus dictated and explained to us an abridged compendium)—these also contributed something to this.[28] Having used these guides at the time, and having compared and consulted other available theologians in the last year of the academic curriculum, I was attempting to write a disputation on the knowledge and nature of God, against the Socinian and Vorstian views, to be defended under the supervision of Master Gomarus. Soon after being drawn from academic studies into church ministry, for a full twenty-three years I did not stop inquiring, whenever the occasion arose, about these and other Remonstrant-Socinian controversies that were raging especially in Holland, and by reading, meditating, and repeating, I increasingly confirmed my mind in the knowledge and full assurance of the truth. However, although it happened that I consulted and compared various writers from time to time, I never ceased from the reading and meditation of Scripture (which is the work of theologians), nor did I store up these and other doctrines in my memory’s treasury without understanding and judgment. I was mindful of that apostolic saying: “Do not treat prophecies with contempt. Test everything; hold fast to what is good.” 1 Thessalonians 5. I did not wish to be a servile beast, nor a skeptic; Instead, I strove to reject and refute the views of those and other fanatics just as much as the views of heretics and of ancient as well as modern philosophers of every kind, which I clearly and distinctly perceive to be repugnant to the word of God, right reason, piety, and honesty.
In 1634, having been called here to this professorship, my initial lectures on Romans 1:19–20, and chapter 2:14–15, as well as my lectures on common places related to articles 2 and 14 of the Belgic Confession, and my weekly disputations on the same Confession, and likewise the corollaries proposed by students and my published disputation on the knowledge of God,[29] and especially the attack on my first disputation by an anonymous pamphlet written in 1634 by a Remonstrant-Socinian, entitled An Accurate Examination…, gave me the occasion to frequently meditate anew on this disputed Remonstrant-Socinian controversy.[30] By going over these repeated thoughts again and again, I made them more and more precise. How I defended the common truth at that time can be seen by our response entitled Thersites Heautontimorumenos published in 1635, section 2, chapter 4, and afterwards in my disputation On Atheism in 1639, with Walter de Bruyn of Amersfoort as the respondent. He later became our closest colleague in the ecclesiastical ministry for some years and in the theological professorship for half a year. From these works, we present the following excerpts here once again.[31]
§ 4. In my disputation On Atheism, 1639, part 2, we discussed the knowledge of God as follows. In response to objections against the congenital natural knowledge of God, we provided these sources of solutions:[32]
1. There is a certain congenital or innate knowledge of God, which they denote as natural theology, preconceptions (προσλήψεις), impressed notions, common conceptions (κοινάς ἐννοίας), natural light, the dictate of nature, and synecdochically the law of nature or conscience (synteresis), or metonymically natural reason.
2. This doesn’t mean that newborn infants have some actual knowledge of God or that it can be drawn out of them, or that intelligible species are implanted in them along with the intellect and memory such that what adults learn are only reminiscences (as Tertullian translates it: “discentiae sint reminiscentiae”), as Plato believed. For with respect to actual knowledge, Aristotle rightly says: “the human mind is like a blank slate.”
3. Nor are those notions precisely the same as the natural power of reasoning or the intellectual capacity itself.
4. Rather, they are something distinct from it, having the character of a disposition, or a habit of principles, indeed a general part of the habit of principles. If someone thinks the concept of a “habit” does not quite fit here, they can call it a “natural faculty”—the way scholastic thinkers and our own philosophers commonly discuss the idea of “conscience.”
5. Moreover, this faculty, or power, or aptitude of the rational faculties, or natural light, consists in this: that the intellect is able to comprehend the truth of principles without any labor, prior study, or ratiocination. When the necessary conditions are in place (namely, the knowledge of the terms involved), it naturally and necessarily comprehends and assents to these truths by an innate inclination and weight toward this sense of truth. It is similar to how the will, by a certain natural necessity, desires the good as such (whether real or apparent) or the ultimate end, without prior deliberate choice, or how a healthy, open eye cannot avoid seeing any light or visible object presented to it. And certainly, the nature of first principles requires that they not be proven, but taken for granted.
6. That habit or natural intellectual power (if indeed, following Durandus on the 3rd book of Sentences, dist. 33, qu. 1, and other more recent authors, one prefers to deny a superadded habit, since the natural power of the intellect itself, both practical and speculative, suffices; which is to establish its necessity with Thomas Aquinas in his 1st book of Sentences, dist. 21, ad 1[33]) comprehends the truth of principles immediately, without reasoning or proof, by a kind of simple intuition. It grasps partly theoretical principles and partly practical ones. Among the particular theoretical first principles, I place first and formost: “God exists”; and among the practical first principles, first and foremost: “God ought to be worshipped.”
§ 5. That innate knowledge of God can never be torn away or completely dislodged from the human mind, nor an opposing notion substituted for it. I proved this with four reasons in my response to the Examination by the anonymous Remonstrant-Socinian, to which I added two more reasons in the 1639 disputation on Atheism, part 2, section 4, which I will not repeat here.[34] Among other bare assertions, I proposed in my first disputation with David van Boxtel as the respondent, this was one: “Speculatively, there are no atheists who are fully convinced that there is no God.”[35] The [anonymous] examiner thus attacked this in favor of Socinian idle talk:[36]
1. “It is an audacious assertion, because no one knows what is in a person except that person’s own spirit ….”
2. “You plainly prove your rashness against the universal experience of all peoples, religions, and ages (to use your word), and I will also add—which is more serious—against Scripture. For does not the Prophet infer from the impious life of the wicked that the fool has said in his heart…?”
3. “What? Is it not possible that sometimes, or for a while, the impious are engaged in that error, so as not to believe that any God exists, and that all things arise by chance?”
4. “Is it not possible that, if hypothetically they concede that God exists, they still believe absolutely nothing concerning his providence over particulars, which amounts to the same as if they denied God himself…?” Those were the arguments I refuted in my response. If those opposing me think it is worthwhile to keep pressing those same points, or to present other stronger arguments, I will respond to them directly and also address the ones I refer to in my disputation on Atheism, part 3, section 2.[37]
§ 6. The distinctions I drew regarding the different types of so-called atheists in that same cited disputation on Atheism, part 2 section 4, could suffice for formulating solutions to the objections.[38] However, just to cover all bases, in that same disputation part 2 section 4 and part 3 section 1, I pointed out additional sources for solutions, which would be too prolix to repeat here.[39] Moreover, I distinctly refute the interpolated objections along with their examples and exceptions in part 3, section 2 and part 4, section 1.[40] In responding to the Remonstrant critic of my response, in section 2, chapter 4, page 183, I quoted the words of Conradus Vorstius from his first disputation on God, sections 19–20.[41] “There are also atheists who hide what they know against their own conscience, and those ‘fools’ from Psalm 14:1, denying God more by their actions than their words. And those who sometimes openly and shamelessly profess what they inwardly feel, or rather wish they could feel.”[42] In that same disputation on Atheism, page 144, I point out testimonies from Arminius and Vorstius among others, that a person cannot exist without an innate moral sense and conscience.[43] I conclude on page 145 with [John] Owen’s witty little epigram:
“The fool says in his heart, ‘There is no God,’
So he said, but no actual fool has ever really believed it.
If no fool outright denies God’s existence, then who is
The true atheist? The one who wishes there were no God.”[44]
§ 7. In the cited book and disputations, I explained and defended the common doctrine (as I call it, following Alting) of our theologians regarding innate or congenital natural theology. As for acquired natural theology, I did not work as hard at specifically proving that, though I did not ignore it in my lectures on common topics, in treating controversies both in private and public settings, and in my published disputation on Atheism part 4 section 1.[45] Instead, I showed its truth and methodology of reasoning from God’s works to the maker himself, from visible effects to their cause, drawing from passages like Romans 1, Acts 17, Psalms 8 and 19, Isaiah 40, and confirmed it with quotes from excellent scholars. On page 174, I also address the issue of the senses—whether and how they can be considered the source (as they are commonly called by philosophers and theologians, specifically by Alting as cited above) of our natural knowledge of God. The role of sense knowledge needs to be clarified, both against the skeptics on one side, and against Vorstius and the anthropomorphites who make God an object of physical vision on the other.
And now I am taking up the defense once again of this truth of natural theology, both innate and acquired, rightly put forward by the orthodox, also mentioned by John Owen in the cited chapter, and previously defended by me against the attacks of the anonymous Remonstrant-Socinian. This truth has been taught fruitfully in this Academy by theologians and philosophers for 28 or 29 years, and is now more clearly and distinctly understood. Among my colleagues who have taught this orthodox position not just in lectures but in their published writings are: Meinardus Schotanus in his 1642 disputation on Theology with the respondent Jacobus Blocquius, J. Hoornbeek in his 1650 volume against Socinus, Matthias Nethenus’ 1654 disputation on Theology with John Vlak, and Andreas Essenius’s 1659 Systematic Theology, part 1.[46] The philosophers who instilled this same doctrine in the Academy’s students can be recognized from their published works on natural theology, pneumatics, and philosophical meditations. Yet these philosophers were able to explain and defend the natural knowledge of God without contradiction, without betraying God’s cause against the Atheists and Socinians and others fighting against God, just as we, with God’s favor, will clearly and distinctly show to students of orthodox theology, both publicly and privately, provided that they see fit to vigorously oppose our arguments and to privately present me with their own and others’ objections, examples, and exceptions. In the next part, we will observe the consensus of the Reformed and other theologians.
[1] Faustus Socinus, Praelectiones Theologicae, 2nd ed. (Raków: Sebastian Sternatzki, 1627), cap. 3.
[2] Krzysztof Ostordt, Unterrichtung Von den vornemsten Hauptpuncten der Christlichen Religion, (Raków: Sebastian Sternatzki, 1625), pgs. 1 and 10.
[3] Valentinus Smalcius, Refutatio Thesium D. Wolfgangi Frantzii…, 2nd ed. (Raków: Sternatzki, 1614), disp. 8.
[4] Johann Völkel, De Vera Religione Libri Quinque. Quibus praefixus est Johannis Crellii Franci Liber De Deo Et Eius Attributis, Et nunc demum adiuncti eiusdem De Uno Deo Patre Libri Duo ([Amsterdam?], 1650).
[5] Conrad Vorstius, Tractatus Theologicus De Deo… (Steinfurt: Theophilus Caesar, 1610), pg. 128; Apologetica Exegesis (Leiden: Joannes Patius, 1611), pg. 5.
[6] Vorstius, Tractatus Theologicus De Deo….
[7] Festus Hommius, Specimen controversiarum Belgicarum… (Leiden: Office Elzeviriana, 1618).
[8] Simon Episcopius, Disputationes Theologicae Tripartitae… (Amsterdam: Johannes Blaeus, 1618), pg. 153.
[9] Episcopuis, Institutiones Theologicae in Opera Theologica, vol. 1 (Amsterdam: Johannes Blaeus, 1650), I.iii [pgs. 6–12]. [Voetius’ citation must be wrong. I have chosen what I think is the right citation.]
[10] Episcopius, Apologia pro Confessione sive Declaratione Sententiae eorum… (1630), 23v–38v; Issac Junius, Antapologia sive Animadversiones in XVI. Priora Capita Apologiae Remonstrantium (Delphi: Andreas Clouting, 1640), pgs. 53–70; Jacob Trigland Sr., Antapologia, sive Examen atque Refutatio Totius Apologiae Remonstrantium (Harderwijk: Office of Paul van den Houte, 1664), esp. pgs. 25–36.
[11] Johannes Junius, Refutatio Praelectionum Theologicarum Fausti Socini Senensis (Amsterdam: Henry Laurentius, 1633); Heinrich Alting, Theologia Elenctica Nova: sive Systema Elencticum in Inclyta Academia Groningae… (Amsterdam: Johannes Janssonsus, 1654); Johannes Hoornbeek, Socinianismi Confutati, vol. 1 (Utrecht: The office of Johannes Waesberg, 1650), pgs. 131–74.
[12] Alting, Theologia Elenctica Nova, pg. 2.
[13] Alting, Theologia Elenctica Nova, pg. 2; Alting, Problemata Theologica, tam Theoretica, quam Practica in Scriptorum Theologicorum Heidelbergensium, vol. 2 (Amsterdam: Johannes Janssonius, 1646), pgs. 1–10.
[14] Alting, Theologia Elenctica Nova, pg. 4.
[15] Alting, Theologia Elenctica Nova, pg. 6.
[16] Alting, Theologia Elenctica Nova, pg. 2.
[17] Alting, Theologia Elenctica Nova, pg. 8–9.
[18] Alting, Theologia Elenctica Nova, pg. 9.
[19] Alting, Theologia Elenctica Nova, pg. 8.
[20] Alting, Problemata Theologica, in Scriptorum Theologicorum Heidelbergensium, vol. 2, pg. 1.
[21] Alting, Problemata Theologica, in Scriptorum Theologicorum Heidelbergensium, vol. 2, pg. 1.
[22] Alting, Theologia Elenctica Nova, pg. 2.
[23] Alting, Theologia Elenctica Nova, pg. 2.
[24] Alting, Theologia Elenctica Nova, pg. 9.
[25] cf. Franciscus Gomarus, Opera Theologica Omnia, 2 vols. (Amsterdam: Johannes Janssonius, 1644), I: Part 2, pg. 7; III: Part 3, pgs. 1–4.
[26] Franciscus Junius, Loci nonnulli Theologici ([Heidelberg]: In Bibliopolio Commeliniano, 1612), pgs. 15–16, 64–65.
[27] [I cannot find this.]
[28] Cf. Cornelius Martini, Metaphysica commentatio compendiose, succincte, et perspicue, comprehendens universam Metaphysices doctrinam (Strassburg: Johannes Carolus, 1612); James Cheyne, Analysis & Scholia in Aristotelis XIV. Libros De Prima, seu divina Philosophia, 2nd ed. (Hanover: Guilielmus Antonius, 1607); Jacob Martini, Disputationes Metaphysicae viginti octo (Wittenberg: Zacharius Churerus, 1611); Chrysostomus Javellus, Quaestiones, In Metaphysicam Aristotelis (Wittenberg: Henckelius Selfischius, 1609); Pedro da Fonseca, Commentarii ... In Libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis Stagiritae, 4 vols. (Cologne: Zetner, 1615); Francisco Suárez, Metaphysicae Disputationes, 2 vols. (Cologne: Franciscus Heluidius, 1614); Gilbert Jacchaeus, Primae Philosophiae sive Institutionum Metaphysicarum (Leiden: House of Elzevir, 1640).
[29] Cf. Gisbertus Voetius, Selectarum Disputationum Theologicarum, vol. 2 (Utrecht: Johannes a Waesberge, 1655), pgs. 539–51.
[30] [Jacobus Johannes Batelier], Examen Accuratum Disputationis Primae & quasi Inauguralis D. Gisberti Voetii (1634).
[31] Voetius, Thersites Heautontimorumenos hoc est, Remonstrantium Hyperaspistes… (Utrecht: Office of Abraham from Herwick and Herman Ribbius, 1635), pgs. 179–85; Voetius, Selectarum Disputationum Theologicarum, vol. 1 (Utrecht: Johannes a Waesberge, 1648), pgs. 114–226.
[32] Voetius, Selectarum Disputationum Theologicarum, vol. 1 (Utrecht: Johannes a Waesberge, 1648), pgs. 141–42.
[33] Durandus of St. Pourçain, In sententias theologicas Petri Lombardi Commentariorum libri quatuor (Leiden: Gulielmus Rouillius, 1587), pgs. 608–609; Thomas Aquinas, Super Sent., lib. 1 d. 21.
[34] Voetius, Thersites Heautontimorumenos, pgs. 181–85; Voetius, Selectarum Disputationum Theologicarum, vol. 1, pgs. 140–42.
[35] Cf. Voetius, Thersites Heautontimorumenos, pg. 340.
[36] Cf. [Batelier], Examen Accuratum, pgs. 34–35.
[37] Voetius, Selectarum Disputationum Theologicarum, vol. 1, pgs. 153–63.
[38] Cf. Voetius, Selectarum Disputationum Theologicarum, vol. 1, pg. 142.
[39] Voetius, Selectarum Disputationum Theologicarum, vol. 1, pgs. 149–53.
[40] Voetius, Selectarum Disputationum Theologicarum, vol. 1, pgs. 153–63; 166–78.
[41] Voetius, Thersites Heautontimorumenos, pg. 183; Vorstius, Tractatus Theologicus De Deo, pg. 7.
[42] Voetius, Thersites Heautontimorumenos, pg. 183.
[43] Voetius, Selectarum Disputationum Theologicarum, vol. 1, pg. 144.
[44] [Not THAT John Owen.] Cited in Voetius, Selectarum Disputationum Theologicarum, vol. 1, pg. 145.
[45] Voetius, Selectarum Disputationum Theologicarum, vol. 1, pgs. 166–78.
[46] [I cannot find the Schotenus or the Nethenus disputation]; Hoornbeek, Socinianismi Confutati, vol. 1; Andreas Essenius, Systematis Theologici, Pars Priori (Utrecht: The office of Johannes Waesberg, 1659).