Becanus on the Immensity of God (Part 2)
Contra Vorstius on whether God is ubiquitously present in the world
5. The other conclusion. Beyond these general ways in which God is everywhere in this world (which I’ve already explained), there are other, special ways, in which there is a unique reason he is everywhere in some creatures only. First, he is in the humanity of Christ, through the hypostatic union. Second, he is in the saints, through knowledge and love. Third, he is in the church, by his help and direction. Fourth, he is in the heavens, through his majesty and glory. And the testimonies of Scripture alleged by Vorstius make this point. Fifth, he is in the abode of the dead, by his vindicative justice.
6. These things have been against Vorstius’ first error. In his second error, he asserts many things which are false. And first he says that God is not substantially in any one thing, even the smallest thing. Thus, it would seem that he is present in that smallest thing according to part of his substance. This plainly follows. For if he is substantially present in some small thing (whatever that eventually is), then it is necessary that he be present either according to his whole substance or according to part of his substance. Vorstius denies he is there according to his whole substance. Therefore, he wants him to be present according to part of his substance. Therefore, according to Vorstius, the substance of God has parts and is divisible. But what those parts are, has been, up to this point, unheard of.
7. We shall show this by way of an example. The humanity of Christ, if we look at its mass and quantity, is some tiny thing relative to the whole world. God is in this humanity, according to his substance, which is not able to be denied, unless one denies that Christ is God. Therefore, either the whole substance of God is in the humanity of Christ, or part of that substance. If the whole thing, the doctrine of Vorstius is destroyed. If a part, it is false with regard to what the Apostle says in Col. 2:9: “In him (Christ) all the fullness of deity lives bodily.”
8. I will continue this further. In his three days of death, these three things were mutually separated from each other: the soul of Christ, the flesh of Christ, and the blood of Christ. Indeed, many drops of blood (which each is itself most-minute) had been separated from themselves and locally separated. Therefore, either there was the whole substance of God in each drop existing distinctly or part [of God’s substance]. If the whole, again, Vorstius’ argument is destroyed. If a part, then in each drop of blood there were singular parts of the substance of God. Therefore, just as the drops were disjoined and distant in location, so parts of God’s substance were, in turn, disjoined and distant in location from themselves. Hence, was the substance of God able to be disunited and separated into parts? New heretics, new gospel.
9. Vorstius adds that the whole rational soul is not substantially in every part of the body. He proves this by saying that if the soul were wholly in the head and wholly in the feet, it would be outside of itself seeing that the head and feet likewise stand apart from each other. First off, this does not follow. For it would not be outside itself, but would be in two parts, of which the one would be outside of the other. Nevertheless, we shall follow up with this, namely, whether the same thing does not follow in Vorstius’ view? Absolutely it does, which I show thus: At the time of the incarnation, the whole substance of God was in the heavens and wholly in the humanity of Christ. But, at that time, the heavens and the humanity of Christ were separated by place. Therefore, at that time, the substance of God was outside itself. Similarly, the whole soul is in the brain or in the heart (although it does not seem to be in his brain), yet the heart as well as the brain has two remote parts distant from each other. Therefore, if it is wholly in one remote part, and wholly in the other remote part, it will be outside itself. But if one part of the soul is in one part of the heart, and the other part of the soul is in the other part of the heart (which seems to be Vorstius’ position given that he says that the soul is corporeal, and has true quantity), what would happen to the soul and its parts, if the heart was divided into parts, and those parts were torn from each other? One of these two things would necessarily follow: [1] Either the parts of the soul would at that point be corrupted and destroyed [2] or mutually torn into two pieces yet still surviving and alive. If destroyed, where is the immortality of the soul? Where is life after death? Where is the resurrection of the dead? Where is heaven? Where is hell? If it remains alive, how again shall they be brought back together? Or would that be a new miracle? Vorstius will not explain this to us. Enough about the first question.